Mississippi College School of Law

MC Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Publications

2013

The Sky is Falling (Again): Evaluating the Current
Funding Crisis in the Judiciary
Donald E. Campbell
Mississippi College School of Law, dcampbe@mc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
47 New England L. Rev. 571 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of MC Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

The Sky Is Falling (Again):
Evaluating the Current Crisis in the
Judiciary

DONALD CAMPBELL*

"Our administration of justice is not decadent. It is simply behind the
times."'

The

INTRODUCTION

title of this symposium is "Crisis in the Judiciary." There seems to
be a consensus that the judiciary is in crisis, 2but what does the
phrase mean? This Article will argue that a more accurate question
is: What does it mean today? The idea that the legal profession is ailing is
nothing new. Every generation faces questions about how to ensure that
courts are both accessible and responsible to the needs of the populace.' So

* Assistant Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, University
of Florida; J.D., summa cum laude, Mississippi College School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude,
University of Southern Mississippi.
I Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395, 416 (1906).

See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
1-5 (2007), availableat http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport

.pdf (discussing the constitutional crisis in the judiciary due to inadequate pay for federal
judges); CHIEF JUSTICE WLLIAM REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-

endreport.pdf (highlighting the funding crisis that is impeding the federal judiciary's
functionality); Lee Renzin, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction-Is JudicialResolution Possible?,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1741-44 (1998) (detailing the crisis caused by the high number of

federal-judgeship vacancies).
See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee Be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise: An
Examination of the Federal Judicial Salary "Crisis," 87 MARQ. L. REv. 55, 55-58 (2003) (discussing

how inadequate compensation affects the quality of the judiciary); Charles F. Hobson,
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in a sense, we are in good company with today's hand-wringing and navelgazing. However, today's crisis is unique and, in a sense, more disturbing
than past crises.4 The barriers faced by prior generations were largely selfimposed, or at least within the capacity of the law and profession to
attempt to remedy. Today, however, in addition to the traditional debate
over the need for greater access to the legal system, we are faced with a
more fundamental concern: access to courts.
This is a disturbing diversion because access to courts is a necessaryalthough admittedly not sufficient-condition that must be satisfied in
order for individuals to have access to justice. Severe reductions in court
funding may risk these two priorities becoming disassociated. The question
then becomes how to acquire more funding for courts so they remain open
,rather than how to ensure adequate funding for courts in order to provide
access to justice. Consider this quote from a recent article in the California
Bar Journal about the crisis in funding:
[T]hat the current budget crisis threatens our democracy, [is] an
undeniably true statement. Without adequate funding, our courts
will bolt their doors and shutter their windows. Without access to
the courts, our citizens will lose their fundamental right to get
their disputes resolved. Without such resolutions, one party or
another will suffer. The party that will usually suffer is the
impoverished one: the party that needs access to the courts the
most because he or she is least able to afford the delay caused by
5

court closures.

Conceptually, it is helpful to think about the of crisis of access as
arising on two levels: first-order and second-order concerns. A first-order
concern is physical access to courts. This is the concern raised by the quote
above. Closed courthouses can result in both the inability to pursue claims

Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1426-27 (2006)
(discussing the judicial crisis faced by the Marshall Court during the Jefferson
Administration); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the
FederalJudiciary,79 A.B.A.J. 70, 70-73 (1993) (explaining the adverse effects a growing judiciary
has on the equality of justice); Peter Alan Bell, Note, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court
Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 587-90 (1970) (discussing the effects of a judge's out-of-court
activity on the perception of the judiciary).
However, to make a statement that one crisis is more severe than another is itself an
indication that the writer is destined to view events through a particular contextual lens. In
1990, long before the current crisis, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard perceived that the
profession was in a crisis unlike any other: "Dissatisfaction with lawyers is a chronic
grievance, and inspires periodic calls for reform. Nevertheless, the contemporary problems of
the American legal profession seem to run deeper than in the past." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Futureof Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1239 (1991).
Bill Hebert, The Budget and the Crisis in the Judiciary, CAL. B.J.,Aug. 2011, available at
http://www.calbarjournal.com/August2011/Opinion/FromthePresident.aspx.

2013

The Sky Is Falling(Again)

573

and the inability to have claims resolved in a timely manner. 6Second-order
concerns involve what might broadly be defined as knowledge of legal
rights and a fair, and just judicial system. A violation of second-order
access occurs even if the courthouse is physically available (i.e., is open),
when the right or ability to press a claim is unavailable because of
structural barriers-such as inability to pay for legal representation, 7 lack
of sufficient knowledge about legal rights (access to lawyers),8 or the
skewed nature of the system itself against the poor or disadvantaged
(access to justice).9
First-order access (to courts) is important, as our laws and court system
are built upon the assumption that those wronged possess the right to have
their case heard and decided by an impartial arbiter.10 If our legal system
does not live up to these ideals, fundamental objectives of democracy are
put at risk." Those denied access to the legal system to resolve their
disputes may very well look to other non-legal avenues(such as selfhelp)or be divested of pursuing legitimate claims all together.12This Article

Id.
See Judith Resnik, ConstitutionalEntitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of
Egalitarianism:The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 973-76 (2012).
See id. at 975.
Laurence E. Norton, II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REV. 601, 601-02
(1997).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V; see alsoU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (extending the Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee to govern state action).
1 REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF

JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR PosITION BEFORE THE
LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, xxxV-xxxvi

(Patterson Smith 3d ed., 1972)("The widespread suspicion that our law fails to secure justice
has only too much basis in fact. If this suspicion is allowed to grow unchecked, it will end by
poisoning the faith of the people in their own government and in law itself, the very bulwark
of justice.");William T. Robinson, III, Justice in Jeopardy: The Real Cost of Underfunded Courts, 27
CRIM. JUST. 2, 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter Robinson, Justice in Jeopardy] ("[Aln independent, wellfunctioning judiciary is the key to constitutional democracy. And constitutional democracy is
the key to freedom. That is why funding our courts is so fundamental and essential.").
u SMITH, supra note 11, at 10. Smith, explaining the sentiment of those who foundthat the
legal system was unavailable believed:
It produces a sense of helplessness, then bitterness. It is brooded over. It
leads directly to contempt for law, disloyalty to the government, and
plants the seeds of anarchy. The conviction grows that law is not justice
and challenges the belief that justice is best secured when administered
according to law. The poor come to think of American justice as
containing only laws that punish and never laws that help. They are
against the law because they consider the law against them. A persuasion
spreads that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor.
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will analyze the unique challenges and opportunities presented by the
current budgetary crisis. The Article will not stop at physical access, but
will also consider second-order concerns. As a profession, we need to take
a broad view of access issues. It is understandable that most of the focus is
on the current fiscal woes, because those are the most pressing concerns.
However, it is important to recognize that the issues we face today did not
arise overnight, or in a vacuum. Instead, the current system exists as a
result of decisions made in response to prior crises. Evaluation of the
current situation should be viewed through that broader lens. Inertia and
assumptions exist today based upon those prior decisions and structures.
In other words, there is a tendency to assume that the way things are being
done is the way they must or should be done, without realizing that the
current system was developed in a different time and under different
conditions.
In 1906, Professor Roscoe Pound wrote an article entitled The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.'3 He began the

article with this statement: "Dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice is as old as law."4 This statement continues to be true more than 100
years after Pound wrote it. This continual dissatisfaction is based on how
legal systems develop. Systems are structured and organized by
individuals responding to the crisis occurring at the time. The problem is
that, as time passes and society changes, the legal system tends to not
evolve and therefore becomes out dated. In a sense, this is a good thing. It
provides certainty and continuity -familiar procedures and processes that
are crucial to a functioning legal system.15
While the system is effective at ensuring a consistent application of the
laws and procedures, it limits the ability to be flexible and respond to
changing social and political concerns. Thus, over time, the system
becomes (or leaves the impression that it is) out of touch, unresponsive,
and unjust.' 6 As Pound puts it, the result is "a government of the living by
the dead."' 7 A legal system that prides itself on certainty and uniformity,
based on rules and procedures created long ago, finds itself increasingly
Id.
3 Pound, supra note 1, at 395.
' Id. at 395-96. "In other words, as long as there have been laws and lawyers,
conscientious and well-meaning men have believed that laws were mere arbitrary
technicalities, and that the attempt to regulate the relations of mankind in accordance with
them resulted largely in injustice." Id. at 396.

0 Id. at 399-400.
Charles Dickens provides a vivid description of a court system caught up in the
intricacies of process over substantive justice in his novel Bleak House. CHARLES DICKENS,
BLEAK HOUSE 1-4 (MacMillan and Co. 1905) (1852).
Pound, supra note 1, at 400.
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unresponsive. The point here is not that the legal system is so inflexible
that it is not capable of change, but instead to acknowledge that change is
not easy or welcome. In fact, real change most often occurs when the
system is faced with a crisis. 8
In times of crisis, reevaluation is possible and necessary. In this way,
crises bring about a "paradigm shift" in how the legal system operates.19 A
paradigm shift represents a fundamental change and break from the old
system. It is a time when processes and rules previously enacted-and
assumed to be true -are called into question. These shifts have occurred in
the past, and the current economic downturn and funding crisis facing
courts seem to be leading to another shift.20
The current economic downturn has impacted both access to courts,
and access to lawyers and justice. Severe budget cuts-at both the state and
federal level-have compromised access to courthouses. 21 Second-order
access has also been compromised. Not only have the types of problems
normally associated with economic hard times increased -unemployment,
foreclosures, and domestic issuesU-but the downturn also pushed a

' Id. ("[W]e must pay a price for certainty and uniformity. The law does not respond
quickly to new conditions. It does not change until ill effects are felt; often not until they are
felt acutely. The moral or intellectual or economic change must come first."). In 1967, another
time of paradigm shift, an author beganan articleon access to justice: "With startling
suddenness the legal profession has recently come to realize that a society can guarantee equal
justice only by providing all citizens with effective access to the institutions by which justice is
obtained and that for millions of Americans the unavailability of lawyers' services has made
justice inaccessible." Daniel H. Lowenstein & Michael J. Waggoner, Note, Neighborhood Law
Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805, 805 (1967).
Thomas Kuhn introduced the concept of a paradigm shift in 1962. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 159-72 (1962). Kuhn posited that scientific
understandings operate within a framework of what is termed "normal science" until enough
contrary evidence is developed that what was previously considered to be accepted (i.e.,
normal) can no longer stand. The scientific theory is thrown into a state of crisis, as defenders
of the old science contend with those arguing for a new approach. Out of this debate comes a
new view of the scientific world. This new "worldview" becomes the norm until it is
challenged. At that point a new crisis emerges, and with it the potential for a new paradigm.
Paradigm shifts, however, are neither quick nor easy. See id. at xi, xii.
2:o Other phrases also recognize the need for underlying change to the system. For
example, during the symposium Lewis H. Spence, Massachusetts Civilian Court
Administrator, used the phrase "crisis of modernization" and cited the need for a
"fundamental change in the culture of the [judicial] organization." It is this recognition of the
need to reevaluate and change underlying assumptions of the judiciary that brings about a
new paradigm. Lewis Spence, Court Adm'r, Mass., Trial Courts, Address at the New England
Law Review Symposium: Crisis in the Judiciary (Nov. 15, 2012).
Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., The Real Danger of Inadequate Court Funding, 51 JUDGES' J. 1, 42-43
(2012).

21 LEGAL SERVS.

CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET
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number of individuals into poverty. In fact, in Michigan, between 2000 and
2010, the number of people who qualified for free legal aid (those below
125% of the federal poverty line) increased by 50%.2 While the number and
needs of those impoverished have increased, funding for traditional
methods of access to lawyers for this segment of society has been slashed. 24
This has resulted in a record number of self-represented litigants who
cannot hire a lawyer.25 In short, the economic downturn created the perfect
storm-decreased access to courthouses, decreased access to lawyers, and
an increased need to assert legal rights.
In addition to the economic downturn, individuals across the economic
spectrum face challenges associated with severe weather events and other
disasters-Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill in 2010, and
Superstorm Sandy in 2012.26 These types of events further expose the
weaknesses and inefficiencies of the current system and increase calls for
reform.27 As these types of large-scale destructive events increase, the legal

CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 5 (2009), availableat www.1sc.gov/sites/

("The current
default/files/LSC/pdfs/documentingjthe-justicegap-in-america_2009.pdf
economic crisis, with its attendant problems of high unemployment, home foreclosures and
family stress, has resulted in legal problems relating to consumer credit, housing,
employment, bankruptcies, domestic violence and child support, and has pushed many
families into poverty for the first time.").
2-' Julie I. Fershtman, Michigan's "Justice Gap": Seeking Solutions Through Innovation and
Collaboration,MICH. B.J.,June 2012, at 16, 16.
Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., Funding Cuts Expected to Result in Nearly 750 Fewer
Staff Positions at LSC-Funded Programs (Aug. 15, 2012), availableat http://www.sc.gov/media
/press-releases/funding-cuts-expected-result-nearly-750-fewer-staff-positions-Isc-funded.
23 Karen McGlone, Framingthe Fightfor Justice, 72 OR. ST. B. BULL. 30, 30 (2012).
Funding for Legal Aid has been slashed which, when combined with
issues that mushroom in a poor economy-debt collection, foreclosures
and marriage dissolution-drives more and more people to represent
themselves. The responsibility for educating them about court
proceedings, legal issues, and how to represent themselves increasingly
falls to the underfunded courts.
Id.
26 See generally Jeffrey A. Groen & Anne E. Polivka, HurricaneKatrina Evacuees: Who They
Are, Where They Are, and How They Are Faring, 131 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 32, 32 (2008)
(discussing the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its effect on low-income residents); Gulf
of Mexico Oil Spill (2010),Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf of_mexico_2010/index.html (last visitedApr. 13, 2013)
(discussing the environmental and corporate harms associated with the major disaster);
Andrew Miga, Superstorm Sandy Flood Aid to Get Vote in Congress on Friday, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 3, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffintonpost.com/2013/01/03/superstorm-sandy-floodaid n_2404871.html(discussing the political impact of Superstorm Sandy).
See, e.g., Frank X. Neuner, Jr., The Funding Crisis in Louisiana Public Defender System, 60
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system is going to face even more challenges in assuring access to both the
courts and justice."
There is a persistent feeling in the current crisis that courts can no
longer operate within the status quo, and that change is needed on a
fundamental level. The questions that the legal profession now faces are:
What changes are going to come out of the crisis, and, How will avenues of
access to courts and justice evolve? Symposiums, such as this one, allow for
collective evaluation of the changes necessary to ensure that our legal
system does not become viewed as inaccessible, or merely as an avenue to
justice for someone else(wealthy or well-connected) and not for the
citizenry as a whole. While the current situation is often discussed in dire
terms, such as "crisis," the reality is that this is not the first reassessment
that the profession has undertaken. Historically crises, while painful at the
time, have ultimately yielded positive results.
This Article will consider the current crisis in a broad historical context.
This larger narrative can provide a helpful perspective in the current
debate. It offers a glimpse into how we came to the current system and
allows us to question our assumptions regarding the way the system
currently works. Historical context is an important (and under-discussed)
aspect of this crisis. As the leaders of the bench and bar come together to
evaluate changes to the current system, the discussion should begin with
understanding how the system evolved to where it is now and with
appreciating the fact that the current situation may call for solutions very
different from those that worked in the past. This Article is structured
around three broad themes of access to the legal system: (1) access to the
courthouse; 29 (2) access to lawyers;30 and (3) substantive and procedural
access to justice. 3' While the purpose of this Article is to encourage leaders
in the judiciary to view the current crisis differently-and not necessarily

LA. B.J.110, 111 (2012) ("Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck Louisiana, washing away most of
the criminal justice system in south Louisiana. For public defense, this was a needed cleansing
that served as a catalyst for necessary and constitutionally mandated reform.").
2' See, e.g., Greg G. Guidry, The Louisiana Judiciary:In the Wake of Destruction, 70 LA. L. REV.
1145, 1145-46 (2010) (discussing the Louisiana Supreme Court's Continuity of Operation Plan
implemented after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita); Angela A. Allen-Bell, Bridge Over Troubled
Waters and Passageway on a Journey to Justice: National Lessons Learned About Justice from
Louisiana's Response to Hurricane Katrina, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 241, 241-42 (2010) (discussing
crime in certain parishes following Hurricane Katrina and the concerns regarding the
prosecutions that followed); Sarah S. Vance, Justice After Disaster-What HurricaneKatrinaDid
to the Justice System in New Orleans, 51 How. L.J. 621, 621-22 (2008) (discussing chaos and lack
of order due to failures by the state justice system in New Orleans).
2" See infra Part 1.

See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part IV.

3
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to propose solutions-this Article includes some suggestions
consideration.
I.

for

First-Order Access Concern: Lack of Access to the Courthouse

The most unique aspect of this particular crisis is the limitation on
physical access to courthouses. If the lack of other types of access (such as
access to effective legal representation) is denial of the "golden key" to the
courthouse, lack of physical access might be described as denying the "iron
key." Closed and inaccessible courts deny the basic right of physical access.
In the last few years, jurisdictions have retrenched funding available to the
judicial branch, resulting in courts facing the prospect of closing or
reducing services. 32 Honorable Robert J. Cordy, an Associate Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, called the current funding
retrenchment a "deconstruction" or "devolution" of the court system.33 The
President of the American Bar Association ("ABA") used similar language
of decay to describe the current state of affairs: "States are grappling with a
funding crisis, a chronic disease that is wasting away our state courts,
diminishing their ability to serve the public they protect. The crisis was
born from sustained fiscal instability and magnified by two financial
catastrophes in the last decade."3
The genesis of the current funding crisis can be traced to budget
decisions by state legislatures. In recent years, legislatures have cut
For example, in
funding to the judiciary at an alarming rate.
Massachusetts, court funding consisted of 2.16% of the state budget in
2008, while in 2013 that number has decreased to 1.7%. In Pennsylvania,
the percentage is even more shocking ,comprising only .5% of the state
budget in 2011.3 While both federal and state courts have faced cuts, the
cuts at the state level are particularly worrisome not only because state
courts deal with the overwhelming amount of litigation in the country, but
also because state courts are more likely to deal with the issues faced by the
poor and middle class.37

'7 William T. Robinson III, A Troubling Trend Across the Country in Our State Courts, J.KAN.
B.ASS'N, Mar. 2012, at 8,8 [hereinafter Robinson, A Troubling Trend].
3 Honorable Robert J.Cordy, Assoc. Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, New England
Law Review Symposium: Crisis in the Judiciary (Nov. 15, 2012).
William T. Robinson m, No Courts, No Justice, No Freedom, PA. LAw., Feb. 2012, at 50,
50[hereinafter Robinson, No Courts, No Justice].
Cordy, supranote 33.
Robinson, No Courts, No Justice, supra note 34, at 51.
See UnderstandingFederaland State Courts, uscouRIs.Gov, http://www.uscourts.gov
/EducationalResources/FederalCourtBasics/CourtStructure/UnderstandingFederalAndStateCo
urts.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (highlighting the distinction in jurisdiction between
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The impact of budget cuts is both tangible and intangible. Courts have
been forced to close early.38 Litigants have been required to furnish paper
for their cases before filing suit.39 Courts have fired staff and frozen hiring,
leaving vacant positions unfilled.40 For example, a San Francisco judge was
recently forced to lay off two hundred court employees. 41 A study from
New York, after a particularly drastic set of budget cuts, found that the
courthouse was inaccessible for as much as one month a year, resulting in
increased delay and costs to litigants. 42 These cutbacks are particularly
hard-felt by self-represented individuals who rely on court staff for
assistance in filing and court procedures.? Funding cuts also have a ripple
effect: some jurisdictions have refrained from pursuing certain crimes to
avoid the costs involved with prosecution."
There is a concern that individuals will lose faith in a justice system
that they cannot access-or a system that, once they enter, they cannot

federal and state courts).
" See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Judicial Reform: Project Pegasus and the Study of the Kansas
Judiciary, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 477, 477 (2012) ("In 2009, the Kansas judiciary was faced with a
budget crisis that forced it to take the unprecedented step of closing all state courts and
furloughing personnel for four days.").
* Robinson, A Troubling Trend, supra note 32, at 8.
Julie I. Fershtman, President's Note, No Courts, No Justice, No Freedom: You Don't Know
What You've Got Till It's Gone, MICH. B.J., May 2012, at 16, 16.
Nancy McCarthy, Budget Cuts Hit Home, CAL. B.J., Aug. 2011, available
athttp://www.calbajournal.com/August2Oll/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx.
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPACT OF RECENT
BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING 9 (2012), available at http://www.nysba.org

/ANfTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=62098&Template-/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
* Vincent E. Doyle Ill, Our Goal: Justice for All, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J., May 2012, at 5, 5,
available at 85-MAY N.Y. ST. B.J. 5 (WestLaw).
Important programs and resources are casualties of drastic budget cuts:
courthouses have had to reduce their hours and staff; there is less
administrative help for the many pro se parties seeking assistance with
filings and paperwork; library services have been limited; pro bono
coordinators who would ease the burden have been laid off; child care
resources have been cut. One particularly disturbing finding is that jury
pools have been reduced; in some instances, courts have run out of
potential jurors.
Id.
* Robinson, Justice in Jeopardy,supra note 11, at 4 ("Faced with a 10 percent budget cut, a
district attorney's office in Shawnee County, Kansas, announced domestic violence cases
would no longer be prosecuted. Then the Topeka City Council voted to decriminalize
misdemeanor domestic battery, also for budgetary reasons. The decision was reversed only
after a public outcry.").
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escape because of long delays.45 Of course in an economic downturn,
legislative branches cut funds in many areas and make difficult decisions
about funding priorities. Courts are particularly vulnerable because they
do not have vocal constituents in the budgeting process. 46 State legislatures
have been accused of "brazenly us[ing] the judicial branch as their ATM in
an attempt to solve the budget crisis." 7 This concern is enhanced because
not only do legislatures have the power to determine the amount of
funding, they also have the power to increase courts' workload. For
example, the "war on drugs" of the 1980s and 1990s led to increased
prosecution of individuals under expanded drug laws - consuming scarce
judicial resources -without a commensurate increase in funding.48 While
court jurisdiction and workload may be expanded, when making funding
decisions, courts often are not a top priority, and may not even have a
voice in the negotiation process. 49
Of course, legislative bodies have always had to make tough funding
decisions, and courts have often been vulnerable -particularly in times of
economic distress. In prior crises, however, courts have looked externally
for methods of ensuring adequate funding. For example, a survey of law
review articles between 1972 and 1995 found that the phrase "court
funding" yields two primary areas of focus with regard to inadequate
funding. The first area of focus is the courts' inherent power to order
adequate funding.5 o These articles emphasize the place of courts as a coequal branch of government and the right of courts to acquire sufficient

' See Rebecca Baker, State Bar: Justice Delayed for Litigants, Poor by Funding Cuts,
LOHUD.COM (an. 3, 2012), http://www.lohud.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artide?AID-/201201190230/
NEWS05/301180086&nclickcheck=1.
46 See Robinson, Justice in Jeopardy,supra note 11, at 4.
4- McCarthy, supra note 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4x See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor In
Deep", 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 712-13 (1995).
4 Thomas Kaplan, Chief Judge Says Deal Will Require Hundreds of Layoffs in Court System,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A28.

See generally Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 PACE
L. REV. 111, 111-12, 149-50 (1994);Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding,
and Inherent JudicialPowers, 52 MD. L. REv. 217, 217-18, 254-55 (1993); Gabrielle Tracey Letteau,
Note, Crisis in California: Constitutional Challenges to Inadequate Trial Court Funding, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 563-64, 575, 577, 598 (1995) (arguing that, in addition to inherent
powers to order funding, courts should look to the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments);
Ted Z. Robertson & Christa Brown, The Judiciary'sInherent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of
Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners,20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 863, 864-69, 880, 882-83 (1989) (reviewing
cases addressing inherent power of courts to order funding from political branches); Walter E.
Swearingen, Note, Wachtler v. Cuomo: Does New York's JudiciaryHave an Inherent Right of SelfPreservation?,14 PAcE L. REV. 153, 155-57, 163, 166, 175 (1994);.
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funding by ordering legislative bodies to allocate funds.5' The second area
of focus is on reforms to the court funding system that maximize the ability
to most efficiently use court budgets. 52 These articles discuss the need for
legislative action to modify the method of court funding from local
governing authorities to the state level.
The current crisis, while still at the core about funding, is of a different
tenor. The judiciary has largely acquiesced in funding reductions.53 Since

See generally Robertson & Brown, supra note 50, at 866-67, 882; Jackson, supra note 50, at
218; Glaser supra note 50, at 111-12, 149; Swearingen, supra note 50, at 155-57, 163, 166; Letteau,
supra note 50, at 575, 577, 598.
52 See Victor E. Flango, Court Unification and Quality of State Courts, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 33, 33
(1994) (noting that the primary way to approach court system reform is through court
unification); James D. Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas
Court System, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 249, 249-50 (1995) (discussing the mechanisms used
by the Arkansas legislature to reform the courts); Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., Court Finance and
Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 1286-87 (1972) (noting that shrinking monetary budgets
are the driving factor pushing reform and modernization of the courts); Harry 0. Lawson,
State Court System Unification, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (1982) (analyzing components of
unification of the court systems and their effect on efficiency); Jonathan P. Nase, Court

Unification as ConstitutionalLaw: The Pennsylvania Experience, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 123, 123-24 (1992)
(looking at court unification through constitutional provision to reform and modernize

Pennsylvania state courts).
31 State v. Lewis, 33 So.3d 1046, 1079-81 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (reviewing prior cases
involving the inherent right to order funding for representation of indigent defendants in
light of subsequent statutory amendments); DeWolfe, Jr. v. Richmond, No. 34, 2012 WL 10853,
at *18 (Md. Jan. 4, 2012) ("We cannot declare . . . a . . . statutory right to counsel at bail

hearings and, in the same breath, permit delay in the implementation of that important right
and thereby countenance violations of it, even for a brief time."); In re Parole of Hill, No.
301364, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 2207, at *1, *28 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012) (holding not to
"compel funding" under inherent power where court redirected funds that had already been

appropriated); Fraternal Order of Police v. Erie Cnty. Sheriff, No. E-10-005, 2010 WL 3820328,
slip op. at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (holding that the court has the authority to

allocate trial budget and hire individuals to operate x-ray screening machines as part of the
court's inherent power to order "reasonable funding request"); Pa. State Ass'n of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 1213, 1231-33 (Pa. 2012) ("[Funding problems] arise out

of the intrinsic difficulties of maintaining the delicate balance of a tripartite system of
government. . . At this point in time, there are unique challenges that all branches of the
Commonwealth's government face as a result of a continuing economic crisis and
concomitantly diminished revenues."). But see State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cnty. Bd. Of
Comm'rs, 918 N.E.2d 151, 158 (Ohio 2009) ("While we appreciate the dilemma that the
commissioners encounter in promulgating a budget during difficult economic times, we are
compelled to remind the commissioners that the courts must not be held hostage to
competing interests when the courts . . . submit budgetary requests that are reasonable and
necessary.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); State ex rel Smith v. Culliver, 929
N.E.2d 465, 471 (Ohio App. Ct. 2010) (holding that the court appropriately utilized mandamus
power to order funding of court's proposed budget pursuant to inherent power where budget
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2007, most cases citing the inherent power of courts to order funding have
dealt with the issue of funding attorneys for indigent criminal defendants
and not budgets and funding generally.54 There has not been a movement
to rely on inherent powers to force legislatures to increase court budgets.
Instead, state bar associations and other stakeholders have started looking
toward internal court functions for ways to operate with reduced
funding.55 To do this, a number of jurisdictions have established
committees or task forces to provide recommendations on how to
streamline or "reengineer" the court system.56
This change in tone is important. Stakeholders in this crisis are not
merely asserting a right to more funding, instead, as Massachusetts Court
Administrator Lewis H. Spence described it, courts are facing a "crisis of
modernization" that requires a "fundamental change in the culture of the
[judicial] organization."57 This willingness to reassess the current system is
a central aspect of a paradigm shift. It is not sufficient to say that all that is
needed is more funding. Current ways of doing things must be open for
debate, reevaluation, and innovation.

was "reasonable and necessary to the courts' administration of their business") (internal
citation omitted).

See generally Paige Masters, Note, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Missouri
Court's Tough Choice and the Power to Change the Face of Indigent Defense, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 97, 97-99 (2012) (noting that the funding problems pose a serious threat to a criminal

defendant's constitutional right to counsel).
' See Eric Holder, Attorney General, Speech at the Brennan Center for Justice Legacy
Awards Dinner (Nov. 16, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/
2009/ag-speech-0911161.html) (noting his commitment to addressing the "crisis in indigent
defense").
* For samples of reports issued in various jurisdictions since 2006, see AM. BAR ASS'N
TASK FORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE Sys., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1-3,

availableat http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/aba/abareportto _thehouseof.delegates.pdf
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013) [hereinafter ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIARY]; JUDICIAL
CROSSROADS TASK FORCE OF THE MICH. BAR, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: DELIVERING
JUSTICE IN THE FACE OF DIMINISHING RESOURCES 2-5 (2d ed. 2011), available at
http://www.michbar.org/judicialcrossroads/JudicialCrossroadsReport.pdf; MASS. BAR ASS'N,
CRISIS INCOURT FUNDING TASK FORCE 3-4 (2010), availableat http://www.massbar.org/media/
750271/courtsincrisis05l0web.pdf; N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE IMPACr OF RECENT BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING iii, 1 (2012),

available athttp://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=NewsCenter&ContentlD62098
&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; THE WASH. ECON. GRP., INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN FLORIDA'S STATE COURTS DUE TO UNDER-FUNDING 1-3 (2009),

available

at

http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf//1C1C563F8CAFFC2C8525753E05573FF/$
FILE/WashingtonGroup.pdf?OpenElement.
Spence, supra note 20.
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This change in tone is noted in the reports from a number of the task
forces created to evaluate the funding crisis.58 Consider some of the
recommendations made by the ABA Task Force Report on Preservation of
the Justice System.59 The Report proposes that courts should be accountable
for providing outcome measures to legislative branches, and that there
should be a focus on increasing efficiency and reducing waste: including an
increased use of technology, an introduction of business management
principles into the running of the judiciary, and actively communicating
with (lobbying) legislatures regarding court funding.W This is a change in
strategy and tenor from prior funding disputes, where the focus was on the
uniqueness and difference of the judiciary from other branches of
government. Arguments relying on the judiciary as a "co-equal branch"
and the need for "judicial independence" are not being utilized as swords
to justify more funding while maintaining the status quo.
History tells us that this shift in thinking will not be easy to implement.
The status quo in the law is difficult to change. 61Many recommendations
challenge procedures and methods that have been in place for a long
time. 62 There is a natural tendency for those benefiting from the current
system to look for alternatives that do not bring about fundamental
change.63 Consider the push for alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") as a
method to alleviate a problem.64 While some cases are certainly best
resolved through ADR, that system operates within the current system. In
other words, from an administrative standpoint, ADR helps by shifting
disputes (and the cost of those disputes) into private hands while
inefficiencies in the current system remain.6sCritics are right to question

Id.
ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIARY, supra note 56, at 12.
n See id. at 12-15.
See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227,
1266-67 (2003).
See, e.g.,Jack Sullivan, Reigning Supreme: Clerk-Magistrates, with Lifetime Tenure and No
Mandatory Retirement Age, Rule the Roost in Massachusetts Courthouses, COMMONWEALTH (Apr.
12, 2011),http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/Investigations/Investigative-Reports/2011/
Spring/Reigning-supreme.aspx (noting an example of how these ingrained processes can be
difficult to change in Massachusetts where the clerk-magistrate position is appointed for life).
When making an evaluation from a business perspective, these types of unaccountable
positions cannot be justified on an efficiency basis. However, because they are ingrained into
the current system and have strong political constituencies, attempts to eliminate the life
tenure aspect of these jobs will be very difficult-even though the proposal will make courts
more efficient.
See Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1266-67.
ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIARY, supra note 56, at 12.
See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1.1, at 2-3 (3d ed. 2005).
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why the public should settle for private dispute resolution when they are
paying for a dysfunctional public court system."6 Therefore, while
proposals such as ADR certainly have their place, they should not be
viewed as a method to resolve the current crisis. The same is true when
courts look to additional fees or fines to merely fund the current
system. 67These actions are counterproductive when the entire purpose of
the court system is to ensure access to all citizens. For example, in
Colorado, where filing fees and attorney licensing fees increased by 114%
over a ten-year period, those most impacted by the fees were the poor.68
The types of changes that will be necessary for a paradigm shift will be
difficult for a legal profession that instinctively resists change.69
Modernization will result in fewer court employees; this will be inevitable
because court budgets are overwhelmingly allocated to personnel costs. 70
In this regard, established and ingrained interests will withstand changes
to the current system.7' Add to this that every jurisdiction is different and
the specific changes must be unique to the state's circumstances, and it will
be impossible to develop a uniform method of resolving the crisis. The key,
however, is for bar leaders and lawyers to be open to fundamental changes
in court administration. Failure to take advantage of this crisis to
modernize the system will make it difficult to convince legislators to
increase funding to the courts. After all, members of the legislature are
responsive to the needs of their constituents, and if a majority of their
constituency views the court as irrelevant, no one should be surprised
when pleas for additional funding fall on deaf ears.
Second-Order Access Concerns: Legal Rights, Lawyers, and Justice

II.

The lack-of-access problem is broader than simply access to courts.
Limiting the debate to how the judiciary can negotiate higher budgets does
a disservice to the purpose of the judiciary-ensuring that justice is
administered fairly. Concerns about funding must be tied to second-order
access problems. These issues are more intransigent and remain even if a

"'
Symposium, Crisis in the Judiciary, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. (2012), available at
http://newenglrev.com/symposia/vol_47_fall-symposium/.
See Steve C. Briggs, The CBA, the Judicial Funding Crisis, and the CRR Statement of
Agreement, 41 COLO. LAW. 15, 16 (2012).

Id.
6 See Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1266.
See ABATASK FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIARY, supra note 56, at 1 ("[S]ince judicial budgets
consist almost entirely of personnel costs, the courts do not have the ability simply to
postpone expensive items to a more robust economic time; and thus reductions in court
funding directly and immediately curtail meaningful access to the justice system.").
"

See Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1266-67.
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fully funded judicial branch is achieved. These access crises can be divided
into three main categories: (a) access to knowledge about legal rights; (b)
access to lawyers; and (c) access to justice.
In a 2010 speech, Attorney General Eric Holder said: "Today, the
current deficiencies in our indigent defense system and the gaps in legal
services for the poor and middle class constitute not just a problem, but a
crisis. And this crisis appears as difficult and intransigent as any now
before us."n The Attorney General's reference to the past raises an
interesting and empirical question. Is the crisis today different and worse
than past crises? In evaluating this question it is important to examine it
through the lens of history, and evaluate how to respond to the current
access shortcomings with an understanding of how the current structures
developed.
A. IncreasingKnowledge About Legal Rights
Those in need of legal services face a dual challenge. They often need
an advocate to assist in pressing their claim.73 However, they must first
know that they have a legal claim to press. Information asymmetry is a real
problem with regard to legal rights -lawyers know about potential claims
and individuals with these claims do not. In a not-too-distant past,
individuals with valid claims had a much more difficult time with
knowing about the nature of their rights and finding a lawyer to pursue
them. Relying on the professional nature of the practice, early canons of
ethics sought to prohibit legal advertising in any form -with the exception
of placing certain biographical information in "reputable law lists."74 The
belief was that advertising would impinge on the professional image of the
bar and create "costly and indecorous competition for clients."75 The 1908

7 Eric Holden, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Shriver Center Awards Dinner (Oct. 14,
2010), quoted inU.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE INIATIVE OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2012), availableat http://www.justice.gov/atj/accomplishments.pdf.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the issue of access to lawyers).
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS
258 (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 2009).
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 14.2.2 (1986); see also Carl Frederick
Cook, The Young Lauyer's Proposition, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 142, 144 (1915). Cook advised young
lawyers that:
7.

[U]nprofessional competition, in that certain lawyers, properly termed
shysters, advertise in street cars, on billboards, and in newspapers; solicit
business by giving free advice, making no charge, if not successful, and
paying the expense of suits; search for defects in titles; follow up arrests
and accidents, and similar disreputable practices. ...
[This class of
lawyers seriously interferes with the practice of reputable lawyers.
Id.
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ABA Canons provided:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our
profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of
simple professional cards is not improper. 6
In addition to prohibiting advertising, the 1908 rules also made it
unethical to "volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. .. ."7 The underlying
belief was that it was inappropriate to "breed," or stir up, litigation.78 These
professional restrictions limited the ability of those with viable legal claims
to know that such claims existed.
The prohibition on advertising was adopted in a society where the
ability to qualify as a lawyer was limited by family connections.79 This
meant that the profession was limited largely to the wealthy and wellconnected.80 These individuals did not have to worry about earning a
living and could view the practice of law as more of a public service.8' This
7"( CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 27 (1908), availableathttp://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_- Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf.The
1908 Canons
were established in response to conduct that we would recognize today as advertising. For
example, in 1902, in a speech to Northwestern University School of Law, Mitchell Follansbee
set out a number of examples of advertisements which were placed on business cards and
distributed with newspapers. He cited to a Wisconsin lawyer who had printed on his business
card:"If a man is in love, that is his business. If a girl is in love, that is her business. If they
contemplate matrimony that is my business.. . . P.S.-I always reserve the right to kiss the
bride." Mitchell D. Follansbee, The Lawyer's Method of Advertising, 10 AM. LAW. 486, 487 (1902).
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 28 (1908), availableathttp://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.authcheckdam.pdf.

Id.
See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953).

See id.
Id. These young men (who would soon become lawyers):
were practically all the sons of well-to-do parents, who did not have to
worry about earning their keep, and who traditionally looked down on
all forms of trade and the competitive spirit characteristic thereof. They
regarded the law in the same way they did a seat in Parliament-as
primarily a form of public service in which the gaining of a livelihood
was but an incident. The profession of the law hence acquired a certain
traditional dignity which it has been the aim of the bar to preserve ever
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view changed as the profession opened up, and individuals became
lawyers who could not afford to view the profession purely as a calling
without concern for remuneration. 82 The traditional view also collided with
the reality of a growing need for legal services as individual rights
increased and the government's role expanded. 5 In response, the substance
and tenor of a lawyer's ethical obligations shifted with the ABA's adoption
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.8 The first Canon of the
1969 Code provided: "A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of
lawyers is that every person in our society should have ready access to the
independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and
competence."85 Canon 2 was even more explicit:
The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if
they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of
seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of
acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the legal
profession are to educate laymen to recognize their problems, to
facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to
assist in making legal services fully available."
Canon 2 goes on to say that lawyers should participate in programs
that inform citizens regarding legal issues that commonly arise.87 This is a
far cry from the 1908 Canon's concern over stirring up litigation, but strict
restrictions on advertising remain."
This tension between the need to educate the public about legal rights
and the prohibition on lawyers' right to advertise created a disconnect

since.

Id.
Russell G. Pearce, The Lawyer and Public Service, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 171,
173-75 (2001).

For example, in property law, rights of tenants to assert claims for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability or to assert a defense of constructive eviction were established in the
mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) ("[Tihe tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's
performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the premises in habitable
condition.").
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrYPreface (1980), availableat http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc.authcheckdam.pdf.
Id. at EC 1-1.
Id. at EC 2-1.

SId. at EC 2-2.
See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 28 (1908), availableat http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf; MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY 2-3 (1980), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.authcheckdam.pdf.
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between policy and societal expectation that led to a paradigm shift. In a
society in which greater information was privileged, an ethics rule that
stood in the way of such information was destined to come under attack.
The Supreme Court ultimately was the catalyst for that change. In the 1977
case Bates v. Arizona, the Court held that the state could not entirely
prohibit lawyer advertising.89 The Court recognized that restrictions on
advertising had a long history, but tradition alone could not justify
maintaining the restriction.90 For the Court, it was no longer feasible to
justify the prohibition which denied the public information about legal
services:
Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial
machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for
a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal
action. As the bar acknowledges, the middle 70% of our
population is not being reached or served adequately by the legal
profession... . Among the reasons for this underutilization is fear
of the cost, and an inability to locate a suitable lawyer....
Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged problem:
Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market
economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the
availability and terms of exchange. 91
The Bates Court could not foresee what would happen after advertising
was allowed. The Court presumed that lawyers would be honest and
would not mislead in advertising. 92 The Court noted that for those lawyers
who did overreach, "there will be thousands of others who will be candid
and honest and straightforward." 93 The Court went further: "And, of
course, it will be in the latter's interest, as in other cases of misconduct at

- Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382-83 (1977).

So

Id. at 371-72.

It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and
not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a
form of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and
they looked down on 'trade' as unseemly. Eventually, the attitude toward
advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of the ethics of
the profession. But habit and tradition are not in themselves an adequate
answer to a constitutional challenge. In this day, we do not belittle the
person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his
mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has
become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising
restraint has crumbled.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
91 Id. at 376 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9
See id. at 372-75.
'

Id. at 379.
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the bar, to assist in weeding out those few who abuse their trust." 94 Thus
the Court believed that the market-along with the bar sanction for
outliers-would keep lawyers honest.95 For the Court, the availability of
information to the public outweighed any potential abuse that might
occur. 96
After Bates, lawyers were able to enter the marketplace and make the
public aware of potential claims. The decision aligned lawyers' obligations
with the realities of the changing role of government and societal
expectations. It should be unsurprising that the ABA filed an amicus curiae
brief opposed to allowing a constitutional right to advertise because
paradigm shifts always challenge the status quo. 97 The ABA argued that
the interest of maintaining the image of the profession outweighed
lawyers' First Amendment rights:
The interest of the public [image] vastly outweighs the interest of
attorneys themselves in being able to broadcast commercial
messages intended to increase the "volume" of their business. A
lawyer is granted a license to practice by the State, and he holds a
position of special trust and obligation.98
This reliance on the past and tradition is common when faced with a
paradigm shift. Established and entrenched interests have an incentive to
continue with the status quo -and to support changes only at the edges leaving the underlying structure in place.
The current method of access to information about legal rights is built
on a post-Bates foundation. Bar associations continue to struggle with the
proper balance between access to legal information and the desire to limit
lawyer advertising.9 However, the parameters of the debate have changed
and the old paradigm is no longer effective.100 The growth of the Internet,
including websites and social media, introduced methods of
communication that the Bates Court could not have anticipated.10' Ethics
See id. at 379.
1 See Bates at 374-75.
5 See Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, at 8, 14, Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1976) (No. 76-316), 1976 WL 178671 at *1-3.
Id. at *8.
* MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 7.1 (2011) ("A lawyer shall not make a false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services."). The comment to the
rule demonstrates a concern for advertisements and articulates a reasonable person standard
for evaluating truthfulness. See id. cmt. 2, 3.
See id.
0 See, e.g., Michael H. Hoeflich & Karenbeth Farmer, Legal Services and Advertising in
Cyberspace, KAN. B. ASS'N, May2001, at 20,21 (noting that legal ethics cannot keep up with the
rapid development of technology).
"0 See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting that use of the Internet in small firms grew from 38% in 1996 to
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opinions dealing with websites'02 and other methods of online advertising
demonstrate how this new media does not fit nicely into traditional
streams of communication. 0 3
Bates viewed the opening up of lawyer advertising as a benefit to both
the public and the profession. 04 Certainly, after Bates, lawyer advertising
increased.105 The problem is that a market-based approach to advertisingwhere the public is reliant on lawyers publicizing legal rights-creates a
situation in which only certain types of claims are broadcast. Lawyers will
naturally have a tendency to expend resources on advertising to obtain the
most lucrative claims.106
Technological advances make advertising difficult, if not impossible, to
regulate.o7 This reality combined with lawyers' incentive to provide
information to the public through advertisements -but only for lucrative
claims-raises the following question: How is the profession going to
ensure that as many individuals as possible are made aware of their legal
rights? Bar associations can continue to look for ways to limit and regulate
advertisements, or communications, from lawyers based on arguments that
they are deceptive or misleading.1 0s Alternatively, they can shift their focus
from regulating speech to providing speech. For example, bar associations
could shift resources from pursuing disciplinary actions for advertising to
providing the public with better information regarding selecting lawyers,
including information on lawyers who have engaged in misconduct.
Perhaps this can be achieved by publicizing imposed disciplinary sanctions
and the conduct that led to the discipline.109
nearly 100% in only four years).
* See Committee Proposes Guidelinesfor Including a Verdict Record on Website, N.C. ST. B.J.,
Spring 2000, at 38, 39 (allowing verdict record on firm website so long as put in "context" and
was not misleading).
:l For example, advertising avenues such as Groupon challenge traditional notions of
what is ethical and unethical. See N.C. St. B. Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 10 (2006), available at
2006 WL 980309 (using Groupon not unethical); S.C. B. Comm. on Ethics, Advisory Op. 11-05
(2011),availableat 2011 WL 7657361 (using Groupon not unethical).
' See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 351 (1977).
o See Elizabeth D. Whitaker & David S. Coale, ProfessionalImage and Lawyer Advertising, 28
TEX. TECH L. REV. 801, 801-02 (1997).
to Cf. Bates, 433 U.S. at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting the fear that this decision would
be an "invitation" for attorneys to "engage in competitive advertising on an escalating basis").
See Hoeflich & Farmer, supra note 100, at 21 (noting that the Internet is still a frontier for
ethical regulation; uncertainty is increased by ethical rules's inability to form as quickly as
technological progress).

" See Ralph H. Brock, "This Court Took a Wrong Turn With Bates":Why the Supreme Court
Should Revisit Lawyer Advertising, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 145, 152 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
'' See, e.g.,Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and "Disclosure
Advertising": Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 395-97 (1994).
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To clarify, the point is not to say that the best policy requires bar
associations to cease regulating lawyer advertising, but to stress that
current limitations are built on assumptions about the state of
communications in the late 1970s that are no longer applicable.110 The bar,
the bench, and the public should be willing to question these underlying
assumptions. While technological advances have passed Bates by, there are
certain fundamental propositions from Bates that should guide future
groups determining how to proceed. First, is the importance of ensuring
that the public has as much information as possible about their legal rights:
Obviously the information of what lawyers charge is important
for private economic decisions by those in need of legal services.
Such information is also helpful, perhaps indispensible, to the
formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the
legal system is working and whether it should be regulated or
even altered.... The rule at issue prevents access to such
information by the public."'
Second, the Court opined that lawyer advertising does not make the
public disillusioned with the legal profession.112 Instead, it is the lack of
information that the public has about lawyers and the profession that leads
to disillusionment:
[Ilt has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise
creates public disillusionment with the profession. The absence of
advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach

out and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons
do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of
the feared price of services or because of an inability to locate a
competent attorney. Indeed, cynicism with regard
profession may be created by the fact that it long has
eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions
attorney who structures his social or civic associations
provide contacts with potential clients.'

to the
publicly
of the
so as to

wSee Hoeflich & Farmer, supranote 100, at 21, 24 (noting that law firm use of the Internet
increased dramatically since the 1990s, but cautioning attorneys that the "old rules" still
apply).
IA Bates, 433 U.S. at 358 (alteration in original) (quoting Matter of Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 648-49
(Ariz. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 370.

Id. at 370-71. The majority cited to a number of law review articles that emphasized the
shifting needs of society and the disparate impact of advertising restrictions on the poor.
These articles questioned the underlying presumptions and justifications of the restrictions.
See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 113-16 (1975); John G.

Branca & Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of
Goldfarb, 24 UCLA L. REV. 475, 515-17 (1977); Note, Advertising Solicitation and the Profession's
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1190-91 (1972).
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The goal here is not to provide definitive solutions or proposals to the
problem. The goal is to encourage reformers who are considering new
ways to provide legal information and willing to think outside the box
when developing solutions. The bottom line is that creating a constitutional
right to advertise resulted in an advertising directed at certain types of
claims. If bar associations and the judiciary are concerned that all
individuals have access to information regarding legal rights, this will
require a paradigm shift in how the profession perceives and regulates the
dissemination of information. Instead of being responsive, lawyers should
be active in ensuring it occurs.
B. Access to Legal Representation
A fundamental aspect of access to justice and our adversarial system is
the ability to retain and rely upon a lawyer to press a claim.114 In fact,
representation by a lawyer has been called the "golden key" to the
courthouse.115 There is a general understanding that without the assistance
of a lawyer, those in need of legal services are substantially
disadvantaged.116 Just as funding issues come to the forefront during times
of crises, questions of access are also exacerbated.117 Two particular past
crises resulted in a reevaluation and fundamental change-that is, a
paradigm shift-in access to lawyers: industrialization and World War II.118
At the turn of the twentieth century, society was rapidly changing with
increasing industrialization and democratization.11 9 No longer was the
concept of citizenship limited to a select few. Until that time, access to
courts was denied to large segments of the population, including African-

14 See Marlene Coir, Pro Bono and Access to Justice in America: A Few Historical Markers,
MICH. B.J., Oct. 2011, at 54, 54("[I]t is also opined that equal access to justice means equal
access to legal representation.").
" See SMrrH, supra note 11, at 12.
11 While lawyers are viewed as central to individuals receiving the full benefit of the legal
system, this has not always been the case. Prior to the American Revolution, several colonies
outlawed lawyers in their courts or greatly limited their practice. After the Revolution, while
anti-lawyer sentiment remained, a lawyer class arose. The issue of the role of the lawyer
remained ambiguous, however. A number of colonies preferred that lay persons represent
themselves without the involvement of a lawyer.
]V Peter T. Grossi, Jr. et al., Crisis in the Courts: Reconnaissance and
Recommendations,inFUTURE TRENDS
IN
STATE
COURTS,
82,
85,
avaliable
athttp://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/
microsites/future-trends-2012/home/BetterCourts//media/Microsites/Files/Future%2OTrends
%202012/PDFs/CrisisGrossi.ashx (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
"' See Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategiesfor IncreasingAccess to Legal Services, 90

YALE L.J. 122, 125-27 (1980).
!' See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 49,52 (2004).
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Americans and women. 120 As court access became more democratic,
additional and different demands were placed on the legal system. At the
same time, there was also a large influx of poor immigrants into the United
States.121 The needs of these groups formed a stark reality of the inequities
of the legal system. The system treated the poor unfairly-they faced
situations for which remedies at law existed, but were, as a practical
matter, unavailable.122 To give an example used at the time, if an employer
refused to pay a worker for a day's wage, the worker -although entitled to
recover those funds from the employer at law -faced a system in which he
probably could not find a lawyer. But even if he could, and could afford
the fee, the expense of the suit would cost more than the amount the
employee sought to recover. 123
In his famous 1919 book, Justice and the Poor, Reginald Smith examined
the inadequacy of legal services at that time and access to lawyers was a
particular concern.124 Smith argues that when the state creates a judiciary in
which only some citizens have access to lawyers, the state is "abnegat[ing]
the very responsibility for which it exists, and is to accomplish by
indirection an abridgement of the fundamental rights which the State is
directly forbidden to infringe."125 Smith describes the effect of the foregoing
as "[t]o deny law or justice to any persons is, in actual effect, to outlaw
them by stripping them of their only protection."' 26 The question for Smith
See id.
121SMITH, supra note 11, at ix-x ("[T]he rapid growth of great cities, the enormous masses

'2

of immigrants (many of them ignorant of our language), and the greatly increased
complications of life have created conditions under which the provisions for obtaining justice
which were formerly sufficient are sufficient no longer.").
122 See id. at xii ("If for any reason this necessary machinery of justice cannot be employed,
then the theoretical protection that the individual possesses under the law is of no practical
use to him.").
123 Id. at 9 (noting that the cost of pursuing a claim gave incentives to the unscrupulous to
take advantage of the poor, because "[tihe system not only robs the poor of their only
protection, but it places in the hands of their oppressors the most powerful and ruthless
weapon ever invented").
''

Id. at ix. Smith goes on to note that:

No one ... doubts that it is the proper function of government to secure
justice. In a broad sense that is the chief thing for which government is
organized. Nor can any one question that the highest obligation of
government is to secure justice for those who, because they are poor and
weak and friendless, find it hard to maintain their own rights. This book
shows that we have not been performing that duty very satisfactorily,
and that we ought to bestir ourselves to do better.
Id.
13 Id. at 5.
2' Id.
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was how to provide access to lawyers for those with valid legal claims, but
without the funds to hire a lawyer. One possibility was for non-lawyers to
satisfy unmet legal needs, and indeed a market of non-lawyers developed,
providing low-cost legal services. 127 The profession reacted by lobbying for
passage of (or strengthening of) laws regulating and criminalizing the
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL").128 Bar associations vigorously
enforced the restrictions. 1 29 While there is an open question as to whether
the public actually wanted or benefited from the protection that the UPL
regulations provided, these restrictions remain in effect today preventing
some individuals from receiving legal assistance.3o
To resolve the lack-of-access problem, the profession developed legalaid organizations.131 These organizations provide free legal advice to
qualified individuals. The movement from private lawyers, or
organizations providing lawyers, to a publicly-funded system of lawyers
was a fundamental shift in access. Leaders in the profession believed that
these offices were the answer to the problem of the unmet legal needs of
the poor.132 However, subsequent events proved otherwise. By 1948, there
were only fifty-five legal-aid offices in the United States with full-time,
paid lawyers.133 In addition, the offices exist primarily in urban areas in the
north-leaving those in rural areas and the south without access. 134
Our current system of access to lawyers for the poor is largely built
upon the legal-aid model (supplemented by pro bono representation
discussed below).135 The belief is that society has an obligation to ensure
that the very poor have access to free lawyers and that society as a whole
should bear the cost of providing lawyers. Recognizing that "there is a
need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for
individuals who seek redress of grievances" and who cannot afford legal
representation, Congress established the Legal Services Corporation
See SMYTH, supra note 11, at 28.
'
Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practiceof Law: An Overview of the
Legal and Ethical Parameters,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2582 (1999).
12 WOLFRAM, supranote 75, at § 15.1. After 1930, unauthorized practice of law committees
"were hounding alleged unauthorized practitioners with a zeal and sense of purposes that
was not often matched by bar disciplinary committees in their attempts to control wayward
lawyers." Id.
'" See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1981).
"'
History of Civil Legal Aid, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, http://www.nlada.org/
'"

About/AboutHistoryCivil (last visited Apr. 13,2013).
2

See id.

'

Lee Silverstein, Thoughts on the Legal Aid Movement, 40 Soc. SERV. REv. 135, 140 (1966).

:-:

Id.

"

See Denckla, supranote 128; seeinfra notes 137-47.
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("LSC") in 1974.13 Public funding of lawyers for the poor was the best way
to serve "the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for lowincome persons."13 7
Unfortunately, the legal-aid model never sufficiently satisfied the need
for access to lawyers.3 8 Not only have the LSC and other legal-aid offices
faced funding cuts-often precisely at the time that legal assistance is most
needed'39 - Congress also attempted to limit the types of cases that LSC can
pursue.no0 The reality is that the current system does not meet the needs of
the poor, which today include "protection from abusive relationships, safe
and habitable housing, access to necessary health care, disability payments
to help lead independent lives, family law issues including child support
and custody actions, and relief from financial exploitation."141 The LSC
reported that only one-in-five of low-income individuals receive the legal
assistance they need either through legal-aid lawyers or pro bono
representation.'2
The second prong of the current model of providing access to lawyers
is pro bono representation. 43 The argument is that private lawyers have a
moral and ethical obligation to provide some amount of free legal services
to those unable to afford a lawyer.'" While pro bono representation is not a
new concept, it became an institutional priority after World War II.145
President Johnson's War on Poverty had significant impact on providing

n 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006).

Id.
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP INAMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2009) [hereinafter DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP], available at http://www.lafla.org/pdf/justiceGap09.pdf.
9 Id.

To fund . . . [the current] need, the federal share must grow to be five
times greater than it is now, or $1.6 billion. IOLTA and other state, local
and private funding sources, which are being hard hit by the economic
downturn at present, will also have to grow in the future to contribute
their proportionate share of the increase necessary to fund civil legal
services.
Id.
us Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533 (2001) (striking down restrictions on
challenging welfare law).
"' DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP, supra note 138, at 1.
142 Id.
"

Id. at 2.

William J. Dean, Pro Bono DigestN.Y. L.J., Nov. 22,2006, at 1, 2.
" Andrew Cohen, In Defense of Pro Bono Legal Service, Whatever Form it Takes,ATLANTIC
(Aug. 24, 2008, 7:52 AM),http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/in-defense-ofpro-bono-legal-service-whateve-it-takes/261465.
'
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legal services to the underserved. First, it provided federal funding for
legal services.46 It soon became clear, however, that even with the
additional funding, the legal-aid model alone would not be sufficient to
satisfy the demand.147 When the War on Poverty became a political and
societal priority, the ABA and other bar associations began to consider
methods to fill the gap and turned to pro bono representation.148 A 1975
ABA House of Delegates resolution stated that it is the "basic professional
responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide
public interest legal services" and ordered consideration of how to
operationalize this obligation.149
The original recommendation to the ABA's Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Services was a mandatory pro bono requirement.o50 The
thought was that if each lawyer provided only a small amount of pro bono
assistance -between five to ten percent of their time-the problem would
be resolved.' 5' There was vigorous opposition to a mandatory pro bono
requirement and it was ultimately defeated.152 The compromise was a rule
creating an aspirational obligation. The current rule continues this
aspirational approach -stating that lawyers "should aspire to render at
least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year." 53
Lack of legal representation in the civil context is truly a crisis. The
current model simply does not satisfy the need. Once again, the bench and
bar need to be willing to consider methods of providing access that fall
outside the current system. For example, lawyers should reevaluate the
prohibition on UPL, and shift to providing oversight and regulation of
non-lawyers providing legal assistance in certain areas of law. Perhaps the
bar should shift resources to providing more educational opportunities for
the public in areas where pro se litigants appear most often and increase
the amount of assistance (forms and other information) in these areas. It is
important to note that the question here is how to reallocate funding
"16Eric W. Wright, Competition in Legal Services Under the War on Poverty, 19 STAN. L. REV.
579, 579 (1967) (discussing the creation of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 as a result of
President Johnson's War on Poverty).
147 See DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP, supra note 138, at 2-3 (arguing that the inadequate
legal representation of the poor has not been remedied by legal-aid organizations).
See Cohen, supra note 145.

'*

* Federal Criminal Code, Amnesty, Gun Control, Bank Secrecy Are Debated by the House of
Delegates,61 A.B.A. J.1079, 1084 (1975).

1"'5John A. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564,
566 (1979); Chesterfield H. Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its Time Has Come,
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 727-28 (1981).
351 Humbach, supra note 150,at 564.
'2
'*

Smith, supra note 150, at 727-29.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983).
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priorities -it is not a question of merely what could be accomplished with
more funding. The same issues arise with regard to pro bono
representation. The current system simply does not align with lawyer
incentives.154 Perhaps bar associations should partner with law schools to
train lawyers to handle the areas of law in which the poor most often need
assistance and provide a level of competence with the obligation to handle
a certain number of pro bono cases in those areas within a five-year period.
The discussion of pro bono representation above focuses largely on
civil representation, where there is no constitutional right to
representation.155 In the criminal area there are a different set of concerns.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that indigent criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to legal representation. 156 The Gideon
holding instituted a paradigm shift in access to lawyers. One lawyer said
the decision "sh[ook] the profession to its roots." 57 Therefore, in the
criminal context, the crisis is not one of access to lawyers, but of access to
competent lawyers.
We enter our current access crisis operating with the tools that were
crafted after the Industrial Revolution and World War II.' This system is
no longer adequate. The legal profession must be willing to learn the
lessons of the past and to think about ways to address the current crisis.
The current model does nothing about the inability of the poor to afford
legal representation, while at the same time promotes a pro bono system
that is an anachronism. This will lead to a society in which the public loses
respect for the sanctity of the judicial branch and views the law as "devised
by the rich to oppress the poor."159
: B. George Ballman, Jr., Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is
That What We Want?, 7 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHIcS 1139, 1148 (1994) (noting that forcing lawyers to
provide pro bono services may end up affecting a lawyer's incentive to provide adequate legal
care).
* Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-27, 31-32 (1981) (holding that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as it guarantees representation, only
applies to criminal trials not civil litigation).
5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
* Eugene L. Smith, Canon 2:"A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling its
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available", 48 TEX. L. REV. 285, 303 (1970).
"* Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 659-60
(1981) (explaining that in the 1950s and 1960s, the existing pro bono recommendations of the
ABA-the substance of which called for every lawyer to participate-were not meeting the
needs of the poor seeking legal representation, leading to pressure on Congress to increase
legal-aid budgets); see Debra Burke et al., Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 61, 65 (1994) (stating that the first movement to encourage pro bono work was the
result of an 1892 congressional act creating a government-funded budget for legal services).
*' SmrrH, supra note 11, at xiii (stating that the inability of the poor to find quick and
adequate relief for their claims leads to a deprivation of their rights); see also Ballman, Jr., supra
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Lack-of-Access to Justice

The last of these second-order categories is access to justice. This is the
broadest and least defined of the categories. Of course all legal systems
have as their underlying goal a search for "justice" -however imagined.s6
The question is how to choose a system that best puts into practice a
procedural and substantive mechanism that results in a legitimate and
respected outcome. In the United States, the procedural mechanism for
achieving justice is through the adversarial litigation system. Parties hire
lawyers who press their claim before an impartial arbiter (judge) who,
applying the substantive law to the facts of a particular case, rules in favor
of one party or another.161 Underlying this approach, of course, is the
presumption that this results in a just outcome because both sides have put
forth their best arguments.
Appeals are allowed, but as the case moves up through the court
system, fewer and fewer questions are open for reconsideration.162 After all,
the theory goes, lawyers below put forth the best case and the fact finder
(judge or jury) was in the best position to witness the dispute and decide a
winner.16 But adoption of this method of determining justice has
consequences. Winning the game for the client may be more important
than ensuring that justice is done. This "leads counsel to forget that they

are officers of the court and to deal with the rules of law and procedure
exactly as the professional foot ball [sic] coach with the rules of the
sport."'" In the end, no one is well served.

note 154, at 1148 (noting that a system of forced pro bono may lead to inadequate results, as
lawyers have less of an incentive to put forth their best effort).
' See Robert Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigmand Possibility,50 SMU L. REV. 433,
436, 441-42 (1997).
""
See Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
803, 803-05 (1999) (noting the system operates under the presumption that the parties are
"endowed equally with economic resources, investigative opportunities, and legal skills").
"2 See Debra Lyn Bassett, "I Lost at Trial-In the Court of Appeals!": The Expanding Power of
the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2001).
113 See Appeals Process, CALIFORNIA COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/12431.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
Pound, supra note 1, at 405. It is amazing that in 1906, Pound criticizes the media for
sensationalizing the courts and reinforcing the impression that litigation is just a game:

[Tihe ignorant and sensational reports of judicial proceedings, from
which alone a great part of the public may judge of the daily work of the
courts, completes the impression that the administration of justice is but a
game. There are honorable exceptions, but the average press reports
distract attention from the real proceeding to petty tilts of counsel,
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The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not only to
irritate parties, witnesses, and jurors in particular cases, but also to give to
the whole community a false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence
comes, in large measure, the modem American race to beat the law. If the
law is a mere game, then neither the players who take part in it nor the
public who witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their
interests are served by evading it.165
The court abets the game in two primary ways. First, by acting solely
as an umpire, the court may allow an unjust outcome -citing its obligation
to remain independent and neutral. 166 Second, the court may allow
procedural mechanisms to defeat an otherwise valid claim.167
This version of litigation worked well prior to industrialization, when
access to the courthouse was limited, and disputes were largely between
individuals or local organizations.16 In such situations, lawsuits impacted
the parties' reputations in the community. Industrialization presented a
new challenge to the very structure of the legal decision-making process.
Justice no longer meant deciding small-claim, local disputes between two
landowners or two contracting parties. Individuals instead found
themselves facing large organizations capable of doing great harm, yet not
dissuaded by the prospect of individual lawsuits.169 As Roscoe Pound
noted, "An action for damages is no comfort to us when we are sold
diseased beef or poisonous canned goods." 70 Add to this the fact that the
country was becoming more secular and theories of morality that in the
past may have restrained certain deviant conduct, was no longer a

encounters with witnesses and sensational by-incidents.

Id. at 415-16. See also Edward Manson, Cross-Examination:A Socratic Fragment,8 L.Q. REV. 160,
161 (1892) ("[L]aw is in the nature of a cock-fight, and that the litigant who wishes to succeed
must try and get an advocate who is a game bird with the best pluck and the sharpest spurs . .
Pound, supra note 1, at 406.
Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 347 (1905) ("We
strive in every way to restrain the trial judge and to insure the individual litigants a fair fight,
unhampered by mere considerations of justice.").
" Pound, supra note 1, at 408-13.
" Id. at 403-04.
"

'

e Id.
Id. at 404. For Pound, the problem was that the common law focuses on an
individualized conception of justice, which courts saw as their position to protect-both
procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, courts require action by individuals seeking a
remedy. Substantively, courts struck down social welfare legislation as violating the rights of
individuals. Pound noted that this put courts in a position of risking their legitimacy: "[Tihe
courts have been put in a false position of doing nothing and obstructing everything, which it
is impossible for the layman to interpret aright." Id.
'7
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deterrent.171
What do the institutional barriers to equal access to justice mean in the
current crisis in funding? In a cruel twist of irony, the system that already
intrinsically favors those with the most resources, for the reasons discussed
above, makes the divide between access to justice for the rich and the poor
even greater. Unemployed workers are more likely to settle for less than
their claims are worth because they cannot afford the delay imposed by
far-off court dates.172 Lawyers who depend on court appointments may feel
an even greater pressure to resolve cases as quickly as possible -at the cost
of pressing rights for clients-to make as much money as possible and
ensure that the court is sufficiently pleased to provide future
appointments. 73
In his seminal article, Galanter divides litigants between the "haves,"
the "have nots," the "one-shotters," and the "repeat players."174 Galanter
argues that the deck is stacked against the "have nots" such that they will
always come out on the losing end. 75 "Repeat players" in the legal system
are typically large companies (e.g., insurance companies) that have many
cases before a court, anticipate having many more in the future, and
engage in litigation strategy with this in mind.176 The "one-shotter," on the
other hand, has a single case, and the value of the case may either be high
or low, but the "one-shotter" is only involved in the legal system for this
one case.' 77 The "one-shotter" may be the plaintiff in a personal injury case
or the defendant in a criminal case.
"Repeat players" have a number of advantages in the litigation
process. First, because they have litigated similar cases in the past, they are
able to structure future transactions to their advantage and overcome prior

Id. at 415. Pound wrote:
The present is a time of transition in the very foundations of belief and of
conduct. Absolute theories of morals and supernatural sanctions have lost
their hold. Conscience and individual responsibility are relaxed. In other
words, the law is strained to do double duty, and more is expected of it
than in a time when morals as a regulating agency are more efficacious.

Id.
Cf Norton, supra note 9, at 601-02 (describing how the financially troubled population
is underrepresented and unfairly treated in the legal system because of its inability to afford a
role in the legal process).

See Jeff Blackburn & Andrea Marsh, The New PerformanceGuidelines in Criminal Cases: A
Step Forwardfor Texas Criminal Justice, 74 TEx. B.J. 617, 617 (2011).

'" Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change,9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97-98 (1974).
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 98.
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mistakes they may have made. 178 They also develop expertise in the area
they often litigate and have low start-up costs for any particular case.179 The
goals of the "repeat player" are long-term. Therefore, they can suffer a loss
in any particular case in an effort to minimize losses in future
cases.18o"Repeat players" engage in litigation as much to establish a
favorable rule as to win any particular case.181 To put this in Galanter's
terms, "repeat players" will be willing to forego "tangible gains" in any
particular case (and even suffer a loss) in order to acquire a "rule gain."182A
"repeat player" can settle cases that would result in an unwanted rule and
can pursue those where a favorable rule can be obtained.18
"One-shotters" are greatly disadvantaged in this regard. One
advantage noted above is the ability of the "repeat player" to engage in the
litigation process for a rule that would favor them in future cases. This is
not the case with regard to "one-shotters,"whose incentive is to achieve the
greatest gain possible in this particular case without concern for the longterm establishment of rules.'8 This directly affects the nature of the legal
rules that develop. While "repeat players" are not concerned with the
outcome of a particular case, and will take steps to dispose of cases-for
example by settlement -where a harmful rule might result, "one-shotters"
are willing to trade the possibility of making "good law" for tangible
gain.'85 The result of this disparity is the development of substantive laws
that favor "repeat players" over "one-shotters."1as
The system itself is set up to favor "repeat players."Although there is
nothing inherent in this system that says that those with the most money
will have the advantage, the reality is that often the financially well-off
(what Galanter calls the "haves") are the "repeat players" in our system,
and the less well-off are the "one-shotters."187 Therefore, this "one-shotter"
versus "repeat player" dynamic in practice becomes a "haves" versus the
"have nots"-with the latter facing legal barriers to pursuing a claim that
the former are not.
The result is a legal system in which the "haves" are in a perpetually

'1

Id.

'1?

Id.

180 Galanter, supra note 174, at 98.
1'3 Id. at 100.
112

Id. at 101.

)'3 Id.
-4

Id. at 100.
Contraid. at 101.

s Galanter, supra note 174, at 102.
'n

See id. at 103.
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favored position. They can afford more and better lawyers.188 In addition,
lawyers for the "one-shotters" are ethically prohibited from engaging in
the type of conduct that benefits "repeat players." Ethics rules prohibiting,
for example, "solicitation, advertising, referral fees, [and] advances to
clients" limit the lawyer's ability to select particular cases to level the
playing field.189 Furthermore, lawyers representing "one-shotter" clients
(criminal defense lawyers or personal injury lawyers) cannot ethically
advise a client to forego their rights in a particular case so a favorable rule
can be developed for future cases.19o
However, it is not only the self-interests of the parties that lead to the
disparity. Lawyers and courts also contribute to the problem. Lawyers for
"one-shotters" -particularly in the criminal context-are also guilty of
perpetuating the benefit of the "haves." The criminal defense lawyer has a
permanent "client" that she must satisfy in order to continue receiving
appointment: the court.191 This creates an inherent conflict of interest
between the lawyer and the client. Courts, because of heavy workloads,
can create pressure for parties to settle rather than litigate. To do this,
courts create rules that discourage or limit litigation.'92 This systematic
preference for clearing the docket and restricting the right to bring claims
that challenge current rules operates to favor those who are benefited by
the status quo-most likely the "repeat players." 193
In the current debate over the funding crisis in the judiciary, there has
been very little discussion of the inequities of the system itself. 94 This
problem, while easy to identify, is very difficult to resolve. In fact, it may
be impossible to resolve as long as our legal system is based upon the
adversarial model. This does not mean, howeverthat members of the legal
profession should not strive to find ways to seek justice. In fact, problemsolving and therapeutic courts are steps in this direction.195 These courts
allow a judge to step outside her traditional neutral role and obtain the best
outcome.196 For example, in youth courts, judges can communicate with
social workers, medical officials, and other officials about an offender's
as

See id. at 114.
Id. at 116-17.

no

Id. at 117 n.52.

91 Id. at 117.

Galanter, supra note 174,at 121.
See id. at 121.
See generally Jon D. Wisman, Wage Stagnation, Rising Inequality and the FinancialCrisisof
2008, AMERICAN.EDU (Jan. 2012),http://www.american.edu/cas/economics/pdf/upload/20121.pdf.
m See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1055, 1055-56 (2003).
- Id. at 1056-57.
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status-even though such contact would be prohibited as ex parte
communication under the Code of Judicial Conduct. 97 These courts are
positive examples of what can happen by applying innovative solutions to
the problems of today-even if that means that current rules of ethics,
evidence, or procedure need to be modified to ensure that justice is done.
CONCLUSION
Winston Churchill said, "The era of procrastination, of half-measures,
of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to its close. In its
place we are entering a period of consequences."' 98 The judiciary is
currently in a time of consequences. This symposium joins a long list of
stakeholders studying what to do in the midst of the current judicial
crisis.199 While often described as a funding crisis, the monetary aspect is
merely the visible and tangible symptom of the problem. The problems
faced by the judiciary and legal system run deep. The crisis includes not
only issues of funding, but also issues of access to legal services and justice.
This Article argues that the only way to have proper perspective, and
develop the most effective methods to resolve the current crisis, is to adopt
an objective approach to evaluating the current crisis with an
understanding of whether the crisis falls in the historical evolution of
access to justice issues..
A critical eye is willing to put the current crisis in historical context,
and to realize that prior decisions (which constitute the way things are
done now) were made at a particular time and in response to a particular
crisis. While current decision-makers should learn the lessons of these prior
decisions, they should not be tied or bound by them. The current crisis
could result in a paradigm shift in the provision of legal services -making
the legal system more accessible, responsive, and fair.

Id. at 1060.
1' 317 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1081(1936) (U.K.), available at http://hansard.
millbanksystems.com/commons/1936/nov/12/debate-on-the-address#column1117.
I' See, e.g., James Podgers, O'Connor: Lawyers & Judges Need to Wake Up to Judicial Funding
Threat,Prep for Political Battle, FLORMIANS FOR FAIR & IMPARTIAL COURTS (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.fairandimpartial.com/2011/oE2%80%99connor-lawyers-judges-wake-judicialfunding-threat-prep-political-battle/; ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIARY, supra note 56;
ABA Resourcesfor Symposium on Court Funding, ABANow.ORG (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.
abanow.org/2011/09/aba-resources-for-symposium-on-court-funding/.
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